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Abstract 
Charities are under increasing pressure to be accountable. Using a novel dataset, we provide 
the first analysis of the characteristics of charities voluntarily disclosing details of serious 
incidents that may threaten their organisation. Financial loss, fraud and theft, and personal 
behaviour account for a majority of serious incidents reported. Larger, older organisations 
that have previously been subject to a regulatory investigation are more likely to report 
serious incidents. However, it is smaller, younger charities where the regulator perceives 
there to be greater risk of organisational demise arising from the incident. 
Keywords: performance accountability; charity transparency; charity regulation; charity risk; 
nonprofit accountability 
1. Introduction 
Faith in the charity sector has been questioned as a result of a number of high-profile scandals 
(e.g. financial mismanagement at Kids Company, intrusive requests for fundraising in the 
Olive Cook case), prompting calls for greater transparency. As Brody (2002, p. 472) attests, 
the charity sector’s claims “to exist for the public good are no longer being taken on faith, 
and more people believe they have a stake in the accountability of nonprofits.” Researchers 
ascribe the increasing interest in accountability to two prominent factors: the size and 
significance of the sector in many countries, and low barriers to entry (Connolly, Hyndman & 
McConville, 2013; Prakash & Gugerty, 2010). These developments have, they argue, resulted 
in greater potential for less trustworthy organisations to join the sector. It is therefore 
imperative to understand the degree of serious incidents triggered or experienced by charities, 
and their willingness to be transparent about such incidents. The aim of this paper is two-fold. 
First, we explore the nature and extent of transparency practices about serious incidents. 
Second, we examine which factors account for variation in the reporting of these incidents by 
charities.  
The salience of our research is derived from three wider developments. First, charities in the 
UK are subject to intense public, political and media scrutiny (Office of the Scottish Charity 
Regulator, 2016a). Operating in this climate presents a risk to charities in the form of 
declining levels of public trust and confidence, both of which are acknowledged as being 
crucial to the long-term success of the sector in generating support (Connolly & Hyndman, 
2013a; Cordery & Morgan, 2013; Keating & Frumkin, 2003; Morgan, 2012).  Concurrently, 
the sector suffers from a contamination problem, whereby the reputations of legitimate, 
ethical charities are tarnished by the misbehaviour – perceived or otherwise – of other 
organisations (Burger & Owens, 2010; Ortmann & Schlesinger 1997). Tremblay-Boire, 
Prakash and Gugerty (2016) attribute the generation of these negative reputational 
externalities to the information asymmetries in activities and outcomes that exist between 
charities and their stakeholders. In response to this gap, the same authors argue that credible 
charities have an incentive to differentiate themselves from less credible ones for the purpose 
of enhancing their reputations. Second, UK charity regulatory regimes are currently in a state 
of flux. The Scottish Charity Regulator (OSCR) and the Charity Commission for England and 
Wales (CCEW) are transitioning to a regulatory approach that is informed by risk assessment 
and analysis i.e. targeting their resources on areas of work that have the greatest potential to 
support confidence in the charity sector. In pursuit of this aim, on 1 April 2016 OSCR 
introduced a number of changes in charity reporting and accountability: these included an 
amended annual return form capturing more governance information, an accountability 
mechanism for charities to report serious incidents (the subject of this study), and publishing 
online the annual reports and accounts of particular types of charities. Third, the increased 
availability of large-scale administrative data about the charity sector, facilitated by projects 
such as the Scottish Network for Third Sector Data and the Scottish Civil Society Data 
Partnership, enables researchers to examine aspects of behaviour and accountability in novel, 
comprehensive ways (Brook & Rutherford, 2017; McDonnell, 2017; McDonnell & 
Rutherford, 2017). 
Using a novel dataset, we provide the first analysis of the characteristics of charities 
voluntarily disclosing details of serious incidents that may threaten their organisation. Our 
findings show that financial loss, fraud and theft, and personal behaviour account for a 
majority of serious incidents reported; and larger, older organisations that have previously 
been subject to a regulatory investigation are more likely to report said incidents. Our 
research makes three main empirical contributions to the literature. First, it provides a 
comprehensive account of the factors associated with the willingness of charities to discharge 
accountability for serious incidents; in particular, our findings reinforce the salience of 
organisational capacity in predicting accountability behaviour (Saxton & Guo, 2011; Saxton, 
Kuo & Ho, 2012; Tremblay-Boire & Prakash, 2015). In doing so the research builds on the 
growing body of scholarship on non-financial forms of transparency and disclosure (Gray, 
Brennan & Malpas, 2014; Lehman & Kuruppu, 2017; Lehman & Morton, 2017). Second, we 
provide one of the fullest accounts of the serious incidents experienced by charities, and in 
doing so make a novel contribution to the evidence base on charity misconduct and 
sustainability – a matter of considerable relevance to bodies responsible for monitoring the 
sector (Saxton et al., 2012). Such studies are particularly important for understanding a sector 
in which losses from fraud alone are estimated as £1.9 billion per year (PKF Littlejohn, 
2016). Finally, this research responds to the call to understand the sectoral, organisational and 
instrumental contexts in which charity accountability occurs (Prakash & Gugerty, 2015; 
Tacon, Walters & Cornforth, 2017). This work has considerable implications for regulators 
concerned with targeting their resources on the significant issues and incidents prevalent in 
the charity sector.  
2. The Scottish Charity Sector 
Scotland has a heterogeneous charity sector comprising of over 24,000 organisations working 
across numerous geographies, beneficiary groups and charitable purposes. The sector makes 
a significant contribution to Scotland’s economy and society: in 2013 charities were 
estimated to employ 138,000 people, have total revenues of almost £5 billion and to have 
spent £4.7 billion on programme expenditure (Scottish Council for Voluntary Organisations, 
2014). OSCR was established in 2005 and acts as the independent regulator and registrar of 
charities in Scotland. Though not a statutory duty, one of OSCR’s main aims is to protect 
public confidence in the sector and it implements a number of programmes that it believes 
will help achieve this, one of which is the serious incident reporting scheme. 
2.1 Serious Incident Reporting 
From 01 April 2016, OSCR requests that charities report certain types of serious incidents 
through its Notifiable Events reporting scheme; these are incidents, ongoing and historical, 
that threaten to have a significant impact on the charity or its assets. Incidents are not 
expected to be uniform, in nature or distribution, across the sector and their seriousness will 
most probably be a function of charity size and type (Office of the Scottish Charity 
Regulator, 2016b). The Notifiable Events reporting scheme complements OSCR’s wider 
monitoring and compliance work (in particular its investigation of alleged wrongdoing), and 
is borne from a desire to: 
support public confidence in charities and their work. Part of our role is to try and 
prevent problems from happening, by providing guidance and advice to charities. 
Where problems have occurred, we want to help minimise the impact to the individual 
charity and the charity sector overall. (Office of the Scottish Charity Regulator, 
2016b, p. 1) 
The aims of the reporting scheme are to get charities thinking about risk, and to encourage 
them to interact with the regulator outside of the regular annual reporting periods. Charities 
are not under a legal obligation to report serious incidents; however, OSCR recommends such 
transparency as an effective mechanism for trustees to discharge accountability as part of 
their governance duties. The incidents that OSCR deems serious and notifiable are not strictly 
defined, but OSCR provides a list of examples including: fraud and theft; substantial financial 
loss; incidents of abuse or mistreatment of vulnerable beneficiaries; too few charity trustees 
to make a legal decision; charity has been subject to a criminal investigation or an 
investigation by another regulator or agency; sanctions have been imposed, or concerns 
raised by another regulator or agency; significant sums of money or other property have been 
donated to the charity from an unknown or unverified source; suspicions that the charity 
and/or its assets are being used to fund criminal activity (including terrorism); and a charity 
trustee is acting whilst disqualified (Office of the Scottish Charity Regulator, 2016b). Upon 
receipt of a report, OSCR considers three responses: whether the incident requires further 
reporting by the charity; whether the charity should be referred to its regional support body - 
Third Sector Interface (TSI); and whether the incident carries a risk of organisational 
demise.1 Certain charities are not expected to report serious incidents: Registered Social 
Landlords and Cross Border charities, as they are subject to regulation by the Scottish 
Housing Regulator or the Charity Commission for England and Wales respectively. 
3. Charity Accountability 
Bovens (2007, p. 452; see also Ebrahim, 2005) defines accountability as “a relationship 
between an actor and a forum in which the actor is obliged to explain and justify his conduct; 
the forum can pose questions; pass judgment; and the actor may face consequences.” There 
are various normative reasons why accountability occurs: it addresses information asymmetry 
between a principal and an agent; it can contain agency losses; it can ensure that agents 
adhere to their mandate; and the agent feels it has a moral duty to discharge accountability 
(Busuioc & Lodge, 2016). It is a multidimensional concept and the literature as it relates to 
charities identifies two that are of particular importance: fiduciary accountability and 
performance accountability (Brody, 2002; Connolly & Hyndman, 2004; Goodin, 2003). 
Performance accountability has two sub-dimensions which are worth delineating in the 
context of this study: process accountability (e.g. the administration of the charity, its 
decision-making framework) and substantive accountability (e.g. the outputs, outcomes, and 
                                                          
1 These are captured in the data and only represent OSCR’s responses to date. It is conceivable that a greater 
range of responses will occur as different incidents are reported over time; for example, a reported incident 
might lead to a regulatory investigation and subsequent intervention. 
impact of a charity with respect to its mission-driven goals and objectives) (Frumkin, 2006; 
Saxton & Guo, 2011). 
Much of the empirical work in this field focuses on a specific aspect of charity 
accountability: transparency. This refers to the provision of information by a charity to one or 
more stakeholders, often without the expectation of facilitating dialogue and discussion about 
said information. Early contributions by Hyndman (1990, 1991) established a methodology 
and conceptual framework for research on charity transparency. The author examined the 
annual reports and reviews of the top 100 fundraising charities in the UK and produced a 
checklist of 14 information types that charities either did or should provide to donors. This 
work was revisited by Connolly and Hyndman (2013) in their mixed-methods study of 
information disclosure by the top 100 fundraising charities in the UK; they found that 
respondents felt donors and beneficiaries respectively are the stakeholders to which charities 
are most accountable. The scholarly focus on charity accountability bifurcated in the early 
2000s. One strand examined the discharge of financial information through compliance with 
the Statement of Recommended Practice (Connolly & Hyndman, 2000, 2001). These studies 
found that financial disclosure practices had improved over time but varied across different 
types of charities and jurisdictions. The other strand analysed the nature and extent of 
financial and non-financial (narrative) information discharged by charities through their 
annual reports and reviews (Connolly & Dhanani, 2006; Connolly & Hyndman, 2004; 
Dhanani, 2009; Hyndman & McConville, 2015; Morgan & Fletcher, 2013; Yasmin, Haniffa 
& Hudaib, 2014). These studies consistently revealed that performance reporting improved 
over time, larger charities are more likely to discharge this type of information, and there is a 
lack of engagement in substantive accountability. 
Recent studies have shifted emphasis to uncovering the factors associated with a charity’s 
willingness to disclose voluntarily information through online media. Saxton and Guo (2011) 
posited that variation in the web-based accountability practices of charities was explained by 
a theoretical model comprising four factors (eight variables): strategy (geographical scope of 
operations and unrestricted reserves), capacity (organisation size and age), governance 
(financial stewardship and board performance), and environment (regional poverty and 
organisational density). Using a sample of 117 community foundation in the US, Saxton and 
Guo (2011) document that governance and capacity factors were most the significant in 
accounting for variation in accountability behaviour. Saxton, Kuo and Ho (2012) extended 
this model by employing alternative measures for some of the four factors and applying the 
framework to the population of not-for-profit hospitals in Taiwan (N = 40). The authors 
found that “the larger the institution, the greater the financial leverage, the smaller the size of 
the board, and the higher the percentage of outside board members, the less likely it is that an 
institution will voluntarily disclose its financial information.” (Saxton et al, 2012, p. 1066). 
Tremblay-Boire and Prakash (2015) also examined the determinants of online accountability 
by U.S. nonprofits but derived alternative explanatory factors from the organisational 
legitimacy and stakeholder theory literatures. They posited that media exposure, industry, 
organisation size, and government funding are predictors of online information disclosure. 
Their results suggest that organisations subject to greater media exposure and who operate in 
the education, health or religious sectors are more likely to engage in online accountability, 
while larger nonprofits are less likely. In their study of Chinese foundations, Nie, Liu and 
Cheng (2016) employ variables derived from resource dependence and institutional theory 
perspectives to examine variation in voluntary information disclosure. The authors found that 
– after controlling for organisation size, age, type and managerial capacity – “foundations 
with greater dependence on donations and restricted funds are more likely to disclose 
information to the public voluntarily as a means of satisfying resource providers.” (Nie et al., 
2016, p. 2397). 
This paper addresses one of the key themes identified in the charity accountability and 
governance literature by Prakash and Gugerty (2010, p. 18): “in what domains and regulatory 
contexts, and in what types of nonprofit, are accountability problems most accentuated?” 
Tacon, Walters and Cornforth (2017, p. 4) also stress the importance of examining “the 
mechanisms through which nonprofit organizations enact (or might seek to enact) 
accountability.” Despite the proliferation of credible work in this area, our understanding of 
the factors that predict transparency by charities regarding their conduct and performance is 
limited. Extant research is characterised by a focus on a dominant stakeholder to whom 
charities are accountable (donors); small, unrepresentative samples drawn from subsections 
of the charity sector (e.g. community foundations, charities that derive the majority of their 
income from donations); the examination of a narrow range of accountability mechanisms 
(e.g. charity websites and reports); and homogeneity of research method (e.g. content 
analysis). In this context, we seek to advance the field by focusing on a novel accountability 
mechanism; one that is voluntary, upward and instrumental in its form (Christensen & 
Ebrahim, 2006; Knutsen & Brower, 2007). The focus on upward accountability to a regulator 
is particularly important as it is often overlooked in favour of examining downward 
accountability to donors, beneficiaries and the public (e.g. Morgan & Fletcher, 2013; Saxton, 
et al., 2012). Finally, our research makes a significant contribution to the evidence base on 
charities in the UK, particularly with respect to understanding the risks and concerns 
prevalent in the sector. 
 
4. Method 
To study the reporting of serious incidents, we utilise a linked administrative dataset of 
Scottish charities that is constructed from three sources: the Scottish Charity Register 
containing the complete population of charities (historical and current); annual returns 
containing financial information submitted by charities to OSCR; and OSCR data on the first 
year of the Notifiable Events scheme. This dataset provides a pooled cross-section of the 
charity sector containing 20,400 observations over the period April 2016 – March 2017 
inclusive. Table 1 summarises the steps in the sample selection process. 
 [Table 1 here] 
4.1 Empirical Model 
We adapt the four-factor model developed by Saxton and Guo (2011) to serve as the 
conceptual framework for our study. We test the effect of seven explanatory variables that 
correspond to the following four factors: strategy, capacity, governance and environment. 
These four factors are routinely employed in nonprofit studies due to their salience for 
understanding organisational behaviour in general (see Behn, DeVries, & Lin, 2007; Luoma 
& Goodstein, 1999; Brody, 2002), and the ability of researchers to operationalise a wide 
variety of measures corresponding to these factors in a multitude of study settings. Table 2 
outlines how these variables map to our conceptual framework. We measure the reporting a 
serious incident to the regulator using a dichotomous variable that has the value 1 if a charity 
reports and 0 if it does not. We model the probability of reporting a serious incident as a 
function of organisation size, (log) age, institutional form, charitable activity, external 
oversight, regulatory investigation history and geographical scale of operations. As our 
dependent variable has two mutually exclusive and exhaustive outcomes, we specify a 
logistic regression model. 
  
Drawing on the reviewed literature, we operationalise seven independent variables 
corresponding to four organisational factors. Size is a categorical measure of a charity’s most 
recent annual gross income; we adopt this three-category measure as it is employed by the 
Regulator for their own analysis of charity accountability and misconduct (alternative 
functional forms are tested and described in the Results section). In line with previous studies 
we posit a positive relationship between organisation size and willingness to discharge 
accountability. Age is the natural logarithm of the number of years an organisation has 
existed. Parent is a binary indicator of whether a charity has a parent organisation (e.g. parish 
churches that are part of the national-level Church of Scotland); we include this variable as it 
is reasonable to assume that having a parent charity affords governance benefits (e.g. access 
to model constitutions). While information on the make-up of trustee boards would have been 
desirable to capture other governance characteristics, this information is not currently 
available in the Scottish Charity Register.  Investigated is a binary indicator of whether a 
charity has been the subject of a regulatory inquiry in the past two years; this measure was 
chosen as it is plausible that investigated charities experience a greater risk of serious 
incidents. Local is a binary indicator of whether a charity’s geographical scope of operations 
is limited to a local level i.e. no larger than the area of a local authority; it is important to 
consider scale of operations, as the nature and locus of serious incidents may vary by scale. 
Funder is a binary indicator of whether a charity only disburses grants to other organisations 
rather than carrying out charitable activities itself or a combination of activities; we 
hypothesise that grant-making organisations differ in their accountability behaviour 
compared to other charities. Unincorp is a binary indicator of whether a charity is registered 
as an unincorporated association, as opposed to other constitutional forms such as companies 
and trusts. Unincorporated charities face different legal constraints on the types of activities 
they can engage in (e.g. they cannot sue or be sued), and so may themselves differently in 
comparison to their counterparts.  
[Table 2 here] 
5. Results 
The sample contains demographic, financial and investigations data on 20,400 active 
charities. The vast majority of organisations are defined as Standard charities (95 percent); 
the remainder are Cross-Border charities or Registered Social Landlords. The mean and 
median charity has £ 1,214,998 and £ 21,127 in annual gross income respectively; the mean 
and median age in the sample is 25 years and 16 years. The three most common 
constitutional forms for Scottish charities are unincorporated associations (50 percent), 
companies (22 percent) and trusts (16 percent). Fifteen percent of charities have a parent 
organisation, while 32 percent disburse grants to individuals and organisations. Finally, there 
is a large degree of geographical variation in the sector, with 43 percent of charities operating 
only at a local level, seven percent across Scotland and other parts of the UK, and thirteen 
percent operating overseas. 
5.1 Describing Serious Incidents 
OSCR has received reports from 94 charities concerning 115 serious incidents (less than one 
percent of charities in the sample). Almost 50 percent of these reports concerned financial 
loss or fraud and theft, followed by 10 percent referring to the personal behaviour of a trustee 
or member of staff (e.g. allegations of bullying). Seven percent of charities were unsure of 
whether they needed to report an issue (listed as ‘General Enquiry Clarification’).  
Figure 1 shows how the frequency of the different types of serious incidents reported map to 
OSCR’s three responses; we feel the regulator’s response provides important context as to the 
seriousness and impact of the incident. For 20 charities OSCR deems that the reported 
incident could potentially lead to the demise of the organisation (i.e. a wind up); twelve of 
these concerned financial loss. OSCR referred 24 charities to their regional TSI for further 
support in dealing with the incident. Reports concerning fraud & theft and personal behaviour 
most commonly result in the regulator requiring further reporting, but these incidents have 
not been considered by the regulator to threaten the continued operation of the charity.  
[Figure 1 here] 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of serious incidents by charity age and size. Fraud & theft and 
financial loss are fairly widely distributed across different types of charity, while personal 
behaviour is concentrated amongst the largest, oldest organisations. Charities of below-
average size (using the mean) and average age are most susceptible in the regulator’s 
perspective to incidents that might lead to organisational demise. Few charities aged less than 
three years, or with income below about £60,000, report to OSCR through the Notifiable 
Events scheme (Figure 3) 
[Figure 2 here] 
[Figure 3 here] 
5.2 Modelling the Reporting of Serious Incidents 
Before discussing the results of the regression analysis in Table 4, Table A3 contains 
descriptive statistics for the independent variables included in the model. The typical 
reporting charity appears to be older, larger, more likely to have been subject to a regulatory 
inquiry, and less likely to limit its operations to a local level. The presence of 
multicollinearity among the independent variables in the model was examined by calculating 
the variance inflation factors (VIF): mean VIF is 1.16 and no variable has a VIF greater than 
1.2, below the threshold at which Allison (1999) suggests multicollinearity is problematic. 
We report log odds, robust standard errors, confidence intervals and a range of model fit 
statistics as per the guidance of Connolly, Gayle and Lambert (2016). 
[Table 3 here] 
[Table 4 here] 
We first examine the two Capacity factors, beginning with size. The regression coefficient 
for both categories is positive, which suggests that medium and large charities have higher 
odds of reporting serious incidents compared to their smaller peers.2 The coefficient of age is 
also positive: a one-unit increase in the log age of a charity results in an increase in the odds 
of reporting. Taken together, these results point to the salience of organisational capacity in 
accounting for variation in reporting behaviour; however, it is not yet clear whether charities 
have greater resources to support their efforts to report, or that larger, older charities 
experience more of these events (and subsequently report them). We next examine our 
Environment variables. It appears charities that have been investigated by OSCR in the 
previous two years have greater odds of reporting. This may indicate external pressure to 
report (though not every charity is aware that it is/was under investigation); or it may be 
evidence that certain types of charities are more susceptible to experiencing incidents worth 
reporting, by the public or the organisation itself, to the regulator. Charities that restrict their 
operations to a local geography are less likely to report, which may provide tentative 
evidence of lower levels of serious incidents occurring at smaller scales of operations; 
                                                          
2 We tested the robustness of this finding by employing a different functional form of Size in the model: the 
natural logarithm of annual gross income. The coefficient is consistent with the original categorical measure: a 
one-unit increase in the log of income is associated with a statistically significant increase in the odds of 
reporting (β = .41, p < .001). 
however, it could also be argued that these organisations may not have an awareness of the 
Notifiable Events scheme, or the capacity to report. 
Next we examine the effect of our two Strategy factors. The coefficient for grant is negative, 
suggesting that charities engaged solely in grant-making activities are less likely to report 
compared to organisations that carry out charitable activities themselves. This is an 
unsurprising finding when placed in the context of the type of serious incidents OSCR wants 
to be notified about (e.g. harm or abuse concerning beneficiaries is plausibly less likely to 
directly occur in the discharging of grants). We see the opposite effect for charities that adopt 
an unincorporated association legal structure: these organisations have higher odds of 
reporting compared to other legal forms. Finally, we examine our solitary Governance factor. 
Having a parent charity is associated with a decrease in the odds of reporting, though it is 
arguable that this is a proxy measure for governance at best and we are not able to extract 
from the data an understanding of the relationship between the parent organisation and its 
charity.  
5.3 Distribution of Risk in the Charity Sector 
The data analysed in the previous section tell us much about the propensity of charities to 
discharge accountability for serious incidents. However, it constitutes only a partial 
representation of the wider suite of risks occurring in the sector.  Figure 4 explores the 
distribution of serious incidents reported to OSCR by other stakeholders (e.g. members of the 
public), specifically incidents that merited action by the regulator (e.g. reporting the charity to 
prosecutors or suspending trustees); these data are derived from our previous work on charity 
misconduct and cover the period 2006-2014 (McDonnell & Rutherford, 2017). For charities 
of average size and age, the distributions of the incidents captured in the two datasets overlap 
considerably. However, there are notable differences: larger, older charities are more likely to 
be captured in the Notifiable Events data, while incidents reported by other stakeholders are 
more likely to cover a wider range of charities that includes smaller, younger organisations. 
The absence of close alignment is unsurprising, as we should not expect charities to report the 
same incidents as those highlighted by other stakeholders for two reasons: charities often do 
not know that a complaint about them has been made to the regulator; and charities are privy 
to incidents that other stakeholders are not (e.g. quorum or personal behaviour issues). 
[Figure 4 here] 
6. Discussion 
This study investigated the nature, extent and factors associated with the reporting of serious 
incidents by charities. Concerns relating to financial loss, fraud and theft, and personal 
behaviour account for a majority of reported incidents, and there is a strong association 
between the type of incident and the regulator’s response. The multivariate regression results 
show that larger, older organisations that have previously been subject to a regulatory 
investigation are more likely to voluntarily disclose serious incidents to the regulator. 
However, it is smaller, younger charities where the regulator perceives there to be greater risk 
of organisational demise arising from the incidents reported, as evidenced by the distribution 
of regulatory response in Figure 2. Finally, the Notifiable Events data capture a significant 
yet partial cross-section of the risks prevalent in the Scottish charity sector. 
Our analysis reveals much about the intersection of risk, accountability and regulation in the 
charity sector. The implications of these findings are framed in Table 5, which maps charities 
and their presence in the data across two dimensions: motivation to report and experience of a 
serious incident. Charities who Report events in the first year are both motivated to report, 
and experienced a serious incident. That is, they were both at risk of a serious incident, and 
have the necessary governance in place to be accountable. These charities are perhaps best 
considered “early adopters”, as they demonstrate a motivation to embrace a novel means of 
discharging accountability. Consequently, “early adopter” organisations may be using the 
reporting scheme to signal their credibility and concern with good governance to the 
regulator (Phillips, 2013; Tremblay-Boire et al., 2016). These are distinguished from charities 
who may report In Future; they have appropriate governance in place, but have not yet 
experienced a serious incident. In contrast, charities who are unmotivated to report or are 
unaware of the scheme will not appear in the data.  If they do not experience a serious 
incident then this is unproblematic (Never); however there is likely to exist a group of 
charities that have experienced serious incidents which remain Unreported.  
[Table 4 here] 
Evidence from a similar scheme implemented by the Charity Commission for England and 
Wales may reveal how many incidents we can expect to be reported in a given year. 2,181 
serious incidents were reported in 2016-17 (Charity Commission for England and Wales, 
2017); given that the Scottish charity sector is approximately fifteen percent the size of its 
nearest neighbour, OSCR may expect around 300 reports per annum, rather than the 115 
recorded in the first year. Therefore it is likely that currently many events are going 
unreported, and more needs to be done to raise awareness amongst charities in order to move 
them from the Unreported to Reported groups. It will be interesting to see whether the rate of 
reporting increases in response to external pressures or threats to organisational legitimacy 
(e.g. from a sector-wide scandal); previous studies suggest that organisations increase their 
transparency activities in response to scrutiny, though this act may be symbolic and not lead 
to substantive changes in behaviour (Coetzee & van Staden, 2011; Islam, Dissanayakeb,  
Dellaportas & Haque, 2018; Parsa, Roper, Muller-Carmen & Szigetvari, 2018). Longitudinal 
data from future waves, combined with other risk-related regulatory data, will allow us to 
better distinguish the four groups, and understand this intersection of risk and accountability. 
Our findings are also relevant to charities and those who advise them (e.g. auditors, 
accountants, infrastructure bodies and regulators). Charities can be reassured by the wide 
distribution of serious incidents occurring across the sector, and that they are not singled-out 
by reporting a serious incident. For professional advisors, our comparison with the reporting 
rate in England & Wales suggests charities need to engage more in demonstrating 
accountability for experiencing and managing risks. Under-reporting may be due to ignorance 
of the Notifiable Events scheme amongst some charities, or uncertainty about what 
constitutes a serious incident. Ten of the incidents in the data were nothing more than 
requests for clarification on reporting, none of which led to further regulatory response. This 
suggests that charities need a clearer understanding of the scheme, and both the regulator and 
charities’ advisors have an important role in supporting organisations to engage with the 
regulator in this way. 
From a regulatory perspective, identifying patterns in the distribution of serious incidents can 
assist OSCR in targeting its resources at those charities and issues that present threats to the 
regulator’s ability to achieve its objectives. One of the most pressing considerations for 
OSCR is whether and how to communicate the insights generated by this study’s findings to 
a wider audience. It could be argued that OSCR has a moral duty to disclose information on 
serious incidents, particularly in the context of the significant reputational and operational 
benefits the public bestows on charities (Morgan, 2012). However, would such a proactive 
release of information without context – what Coglianese (2009) terms “fishbowl 
transparency” – reduce the information asymmetries that exist between charities and their 
external stakeholders (Tremblay-Boire & Prakash, 2017)? There are long-standing concerns 
about the ability of stakeholders to parse financial and performance information that must be 
taken into consideration, especially in the context of an era of heightened scrutiny (Britton, 
2008; Connolly et al., 2013; Keating & Frumkin, 2003; Phillips, 2013). These considerations 
might also influence the willingness of charities to voluntarily disclose serious incidents in 
the first place, hampering the ability of the regulator to identify and mitigate risk in the 
sector. Finally, it is prudent to consider what policy response is appropriate from OSCR, 
beyond those captured in the data (i.e. further reporting, potential demise). At a time when it 
is required to do “more with less”, is OSCR justified in demanding additional information 
from charities, and does it possess the resources necessary to offer support, regulatory relief 
or leniency to charities that do report (Prakash & Potoski, 2006)? It is only with longitudinal 
data that we will be able to assess the link between the reporting of serious incidents, 
organisational outcomes, and the appropriateness of OSCR’s response. 
There are a number of limitations to this research that must be acknowledged. The first 
concerns the ambiguity of exactly what a reported incident represents. It could mean that a 
charity is particularly risky, prone to the sort of incident that would require notifying the 
regulator. Alternatively, it may mean that the charity has good risk management procedures 
in place, promptly identifying serious incidents and communicating them to trustees and to 
the regulator. Another example of this ambiguity is OSCR’s list of example serious incidents 
that have not been reported by the charities in our data (e.g. significant sums of money, other 
property donated to the charity from an unknown or unverified source): is this evidence of 
these incidents not occurring, or are they less likely to be reported relative to others? This is a 
perennial issue for both regulators and researchers. There is a dearth of governance variables 
in the data and we were not able to examine the influence of these factors as we would have 
liked. As this is a nascent accountability mechanism for which we have only one year of data, 
the multivariate results are best considered as indicators of the factors associated with 
reporting serious incidents. There are also limits to the extent that we can explain behaviour 
using administrative (i.e. secondary) data; for example, we do not capture the degree of 
investment and intensity that charities commit to engaging in accountability behaviour. As 
stated previously, it would be remiss to consider the first wave of reporting charities as 
representative of all charities willing to discharge accountability in this way. Finally, we do 
not include variables derived from resource dependence theory (e.g. reliance on private 
donations or government funding); though measures could be constructed using existing data, 
these would only apply to a subset of larger charities (i.e. annual gross income of at least 
£250,000).  
7. Conclusion 
There are a number of fruitful avenues of research arising from the findings of this study. It 
would be instructive to understand the factors charities take into account when deciding 
whether to report serious incidents to the regulator: are they motivated by a sense of moral 
duty, under pressure from internal or external stakeholders, or, as suggested by Busuioc and 
Lodge (2016), are they driven by reputational concerns? An in-depth examination of 
reporting charities could also provide evidence of organisational interest, intensity and 
investment in accountability relationships, and whether these charities are under more 
pressure to be transparent in general or just in the context of the Notifiable Events scheme. 
As longitudinal data becomes available, and participation by charities increases, researchers 
can focus on the organisational outcomes (for charities and regulators) of engagement with 
the Notifiable Events reporting scheme. As the sample size grows, further work could also 
consider finer grained modelling of the different types of serious incidents. Finally, the 
existence of other serious incident reporting mechanisms in other areas (e.g. England & 
Wales) provides the potential for cross-national and/or sectoral comparisons. 
One thing is clear: the increasing availability of high-quality administrative data about the 
charity sector provides a real opportunity for both researchers and regulators to respond to the 
call for greater accountability of charitable organisations with a deeper understanding of both 
the size and distribution of risk in the sector.  
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1. Charity Accountability Dataset: Sample Selection Process 
  
Sample Selection  
  
Initial sample in Scottish Charity Register 47,285 
  
   Removal of charities with invalid legal names 
(corresponds to organizations never recognised 
by previous regulatory regime) 
1,777 
  
   Removal of charities never recognised by 
OSCR when it took up its regulatory powers or 
those subsequently removed during the process of 
establishing an accurate charity register 
12,371 
  
   Removal of charities with income of £0 3,850 
  
   Removal of charities with missing data for 
income 
1,778 
  
   Removal of charities that are inactive, non-
submitting or not monitored 
7,109 
  
Final sample 20,400 charities 
Note: Non-submitting charities were removed on the advice of OSCR; they are registered 
charities but have failed to comply with their reporting requirements. Though encouraged to 
report to their main regulator instead of OSCR, we included notifiable events reported by 
Cross Border charities (n = 8) and Registered Social Landlords (n = 1).  
  
Table 2. Conceptual Framework 
Factor Variable Operationalisation 
Strategy Funder 1 = Disburses grants to other organisations 
0 = Carries out charitable activities itself or a 
combination of functions 
 Unincorp 1 = Charity is registered as an unincorporated 
association 
0 = Charity is not registered as an 
unincorporated association (e.g. company, 
trust) 
   
Capacity Size 1 = £1 - £99,999 
2 = £100,000 - £499,999 
3 = £500,000 + 
 
 Age Natural log of the number of years a charity 
has existed (most recent annual return year – 
registration year) 
   
Governance Parent 1 = Charity has a parent organisation 
0 = Charity does not have a parent 
organisation 
   
Environment Investigated 1 = OSCR has opened an inquiry case into a 
complaint against a charity in the previous 
two years 
0 = OSCR has not opened an inquiry case into 
a complaint against a charity in the previous 
two years 
 Local 1 = Conducts its operations at a local level 
only 
0 = Conducts its operations at a wider 
geography (e.g. overseas) 
  
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for the Outcome of Reporting 
          
  Do not report 
(n = 20,306) 
 Report 
(n = 94) 
 Whole sample 
(n = 20,400) 
Variable  M SD  M SD  M SD 
Age (log)  2.77 1.01  3.07 1.03  2.77 1.01 
Grant  .32 .47  .23 .43  .32 .47 
Parent  .15 .36  .14 .35  .15 .36 
Local  .43 .49  .21 .41  .43 .49 
Unincorp  .16 .36  .09 .28  .16 .36 
Investigated  .03 .17  .16 .37  .03 .17 
Size (%) 
 
£1 - £99,999 
£100,000 - £499,999 
£500,000 + 
53 
37 
10 
-  9 
49 
43 
-  53 
37 
10 
- 
Note: Figures rounded to two decimal places or nearest whole number for percentages. 
  
Table 4. Results of Logistic Regression for Outcome of Reporting 
  Log odds SE (robust) 95% CI 
    Lower Upper 
Size £1 - £99,999 Ref. – – – 
 £100,000 - £499,999 1.90*** .40 1.12 2.68 
 £500,000 + 2.94*** .42 2.11 3.77 
Age  .35** .13 .10 .60 
Funder  -.46 .25 -.96 .03 
Unincorp  -.34 .40 -1.12 .45 
Parent  -.26 .37 -.98 .46 
Local  -.46 .30 -1.05 .13 
Investigated  .95** .31 .35 1.55 
n  20,400   
McFadden’s 
adjusted R2 
 .09   
McKelvey and 
Zavoina’s R2 
 .34   
Cragg and Uhler’s 
R2 
 .12   
BIC full model  -201,227.75   
Note: Figures rounded to two decimal places. Constant is omitted. CI: confidence interval; 
BIC: Information Criterion. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
  
Table 5. Mapping Serious Incidents  
  Serious Incident 
  Yes No 
Motivation to Report Yes Report In Future 
No Unreported Never 
  
Figure 1. Reported Serious Incidents and Regulator Response 
 
Note: Serious incident types are shown in the left of the diagram, and regulator response on 
the right. The thickness of the line represents the strength of the association between an 
incident and a response: for instance, Fraud & Theft incidents very often require further 
reporting by the charity to OSCR. A serious incident can be marked with more than one 
response, so the percentages on the right do not sum to 100 percent. Association between 
serious incident and regulator response: potential demise (Cramer’s V = 0.67, p < .001); 
further reporting (Cramer’s V = 0.61, p < .001); and TSI referral (Cramer’s V = 0.54, p < 
.001). 
[IN COLOUR] Figure 2. Distribution of Serious Incidents, by Charity Age and Size 
 
 
Note: Each large point represents an organisation reporting a serious incident. The incident 
type is indicated by the label. Red crosses indicate OSCR’s concern that there is a risk of 
organisational demise arising from the incident. 
  
Figure 3. Estimated Reporting Rate of Serious Incidents, by Charity Age and Size 
 
 
Note: Reported incidents are relatively rare in the sample, and so calculations of the reporting 
rate are sensitive to the choice of grouping within metric variables. In order to account for 
this, the reporting rate is calculated as a moving average across charity age (gross income).  
The dark red line calculates the proportion of charities reporting an incident for organisations 
+/- 10 years (+/- 20% gross income), while the light red line shows the proportion for 
organisations +/- 5 years (+/- 10% gross income). The graph shows that the reporting rate 
increases in both age and income, and most steeply at the top of the age and income 
distributions.  However, there is a cluster of higher reporting for charities aged around 70 to 
80 years old.  Similarly, there is a cluster of higher than average reporting rates for charities 
around the £12 million income level. 
 
  
[IN COLOUR] Figure 4. Distribution of Risk in the Scottish Charity Sector, by Charity Age 
and Size 
 
 
